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Abstract. We present a coalgebraic semantics for reasoning about in-
formation update in multi-agent systems. The novelty is that we have one
structure for both states and actions and thus our models do not involve
the ”change-of-model” phenomena that arise when using Kripke models.
However, we prove that the usual models can be constructed from ours
by categorical adjunction. The generality and abstraction of our coal-
gebraic model turns out to be extremely useful in proving preservation
properties of update. In particular, we prove that positive knowledge is
preserved and acquired as a result of epistemic update. We also prove
common and nested knowledge properties of epistemic updates induced
by speciﬁc epistemic actions such as public and private announcements,
lying, and in particular unsafe actions of security protocols. Our model
directly gives rise to a coalgebraic logic with both dynamic and epis-
temic modalities. We prove a soundness and completeness result for this
logic, and illustrate the applicability of the logic by deriving knowledge
properties of a simple security protocol.
1 Introduction
Modelling interactive multi-agent systems has a wide range of applications, e.g.
in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, computer security and e-commerce. In such systems
agents communicate and as a result their knowledge gets updated, and there-
fore one has to model the epistemics and dynamics of the system. The Kripke
and algebraic models of these settings have been presented in [9,10,3,2,14]. The
Kripke models have the advantage of being intuitive and concrete, while the
algebraic setting beneﬁts from high level features that result from mathematical
abstraction.
In this paper we develop a coalgebraic semantics for dynamic epistemic sys-
tems, which combines the advantages of both the Kripke and the algebraic
setting. Our model reasons about such systems in a uniform way, by treating
both actions and agents as state transformers. Thus, we have only one struc-
ture that captures both dynamics and epistemics. This is contrary to the models
of e.g. [10,3,1] that require subsequent ”changes” to the epistemic structure to
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model the dynamics. By ”change” we mean either the update product between
an epistemic Kripke structure and an action Kripke structure [3], or the up-
date functor on the category of epistemic coalgebras [10,1]. In either case the
epistemic structure is taken to be primitive and the dynamics is captured by
operations on it. This brings us to the other novelty of our approach: we start
our modelling task by ﬁxing the epistemic actions, and then deﬁne the epistemic
states based on these actions and on the agents participating in them. Again,
this is contrary to the models of [10,3,1], which involve ﬁrst ﬁxing the epistemic
states and then deﬁning all possible epistemic actions on these states. Although
at ﬁrst sight our approach seems very diﬀerent from the approach of [10,3,1],
the two are strongly connected. In the main theorem of our paper we show how
to construct from our models the models of [1] and vice versa, and prove that
these constructions form a categorical adjunction1.
Our approach has all the advantages of the approach in [3,1], for instance it
beneﬁts from a general updating schema and it reﬂects the epistemic structure
of actions. Moreover, our approach does not have the usual weaknesses, for ex-
ample operations on actions are a natural part of our models, e.g. sequential
composition is simply unfolding the coalgebra maps twice and does not need to
be deﬁned separately. The generality and abstraction of our coalgebraic models
turns out to be extremely useful in proving preservation properties of update.
In particular, we prove that positive knowledge is preserved and acquired as a
result of epistemic update. We also prove common and nested knowledge prop-
erties of epistemic updates induced by speciﬁc epistemic actions such as public
and private announcements, lying, and in particular unsafe actions of security
protocols. Finally, our model directly gives rise to a coalgebraic logic with both
epistemic and dynamic modalities. This, for instance, cannot be done for the
models of [10,1]. We prove a soundness and completeness result for the resulting
logic. As an example of application, we derive the authentication properties of
a security protocol.
An extended version of this paper is available electronically [8]. There we
illustrate the applicability of our models to general scenarios involving both
positive and negative knowledge, by presenting a new coalgebraic proof of the
muddy children puzzle and a version of it with cheating children. Our proofs are
based on restrictive recursion rather than the usual induction.
2 Coalgebraic Semantics for Actions and Agents
We consider coalgebras of the following signature functor T : Set → Set
TX= Pκ(X)
Ag × (1 + X)
Ac ×P(At)
where κ is a regular cardinal. A coalgebra map for the above functor is thus a
triple γ =  ap,up,val  : S →P κ(S)Ag×(1+S)Ac×P(At). The valuation map val
1 As noted by one of our referees, our model might share ideas with the recent epistemic
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assigns to each state the facts that are true in that state. The (nondeterministic)
appearance of states in S to agents in Ag is modelled by the function ap : S →
P(S)Ag, whereas the (deterministic) eﬀect of actions in Ac on states in S is
modelled by a function up : S → (1 + S)Ac.T h u s ,up(s)(a) stands for the eﬀect
of the action a on the state s, or the update of s by a. If this eﬀect is the unique
element ∗ of 1, that is, if up(s)(a)=∗ 2, we say that action a does not apply in
state s; this should be the case, for instance, when a is the announcement of a
fact that does not belong to val(s). The choice of functor T automatically yields
notions of T-bisimulation and T-bisimilarity for T-coalgebras (see e.g. [16]).
2.1 Restrictions to the Coalgebras
We are interested in using T-coalgebras to model the eﬀect of communication
actions on the information state or knowledge of agents. Examples of such actions
are public or secret announcements, and message passing actions in a multi-
agent system. We want to model the eﬀect of updates with such actions on the
appearances of states to the agents and on the valuations of states. In order to
limit the behaviour of our systems to the eﬀect of these actions, we require that
the coalgebra maps satisfy some additional conditions, detailed in the following.
The communication actions that we model are epistemic,t h a ti s ,t h e yo n l y
aﬀect the information states of agents, while leaving the facts of the world un-
changed. Our ﬁrst restriction, called preservation of facts, reﬂects this point:
val(up(s)(a)) = val(s) whenever up(s)(a)  = ∗
It says that, if applicable to a state, an action does not change the valuation
of that state. So the valuation of the eﬀect of the action is the same as the
valuation of the state before the action. We need this restriction to prove the
preservation results in Section 2.2. In a more general approach, one can divide
the set of actions into two subsets, namely information-changing actions and
fact-changing actions, and only require this restriction for actions of the ﬁrst
type.
Our second restriction concerns the appearance of an update to each agent
involved in the corresponding action. For applicable updates up(s)(a)  = ∗,t h i s
will be related to the update of each of the agent’s appearances t ∈ ap(s)(A)
with a ﬁnite subset of actions Aca,A ⊆ Ac, as follows
ap(up(s)(a))(A)=

up(t)(a
 ) | t ∈ ap(s)(A),a
  ∈ Aca,A,u p (t)(a
 )  = ∗

where the actions Aca,A depend both on the action a and on agent A’s involve-
ment in it, and are intended to capture agent A’s appearance of the action a.
This relation says that if an action a applies to a state s, then the appearance
of its eﬀect to an agent A is the same as the eﬀect of one of the actions in Aca,A
2 Here and in what follows, we assume that 1 ∩ S = ∅. Under this assumption, and
to simplify the notation, we regard elements of the set 1 + S as being either ∗ or
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on one of the appearances to A of the original state s. The case when Aca,A is a
singleton {a } corresponds to a deterministic view of A about the real action a
(with A thinking that a  is happening when in fact a is happening), whereas any
non-singleton set Aca,A captures A’s uncertainty about the action taking place.
We refer to the collection of all instances of this restriction (one for each action
in Ac)a srationality.
The content of an epistemic action, as its name suggests, describes the infor-
mation that is being transmitted as a result of the action taking place. We use
the following syntax to denote speciﬁc contents3:
μ := p | A μ | tt |¬ μ |

i∈I
μi
with p ∈ At and I an arbitrary set. That is, the content of an action can be
a fact, the knowledge or belief of some other content by an agent4, the true
proposition, the negation of a content, or a potentially inﬁnite conjunction of
contents5. In particular, the content can involve nested knowledge, as in ABp.
We do not allow contents to refer to (the eﬀect of) actions, as in [q]−;t h i s
avoids a circularity between requiring each action to have a content and allowing
contents to depend on actions. Contents whose only occurrences of the negation
operator immediately precede a fact are called positive contents, otherwise they
are referred to as negative contents.
From now on, we assume that each action a ∈ A has a content μa associated
to it. Then, a should be applicable precisely to those states where its content μa
is satisﬁed. This is encoded as a further restriction on T-coalgebras, referred to
as the content restriction:
up(s)(a)  = ∗ iﬀ s |= μa
where the relation |= between states and contents of actions is deﬁned by struc-
tural induction on contents:
– s |= p iﬀ p ∈ val(s)
– s |= Aμ iﬀ t |= μ for all t ∈ ap(s)(A)
and the usual clauses for the true proposition, negation and conjunction.
Deﬁnition 1. An appearance-update coalgebra is a T-coalgebra additionally
satisfying the preservation of facts, content, and rationality restrictions. We de-
note the set of all of these restrictions by R.
3 We emphasise that this is just a syntax for expressing our second restriction on the
content s of actions. The logic will be presented in section 5.
4 Similarly to [3] and as a result of accommodating misinformation actions, our knowl-
edge A is not necessarily truthful. Indeed, one can also think of A as belief in
contexts where no wrong knowledge is allowed.
5 The inﬁnite contents are just a technicality that is needed later in order to establish
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2.2 Preservation and Acquisition of Knowledge
An important consequence of the restrictions in R is the so-called preservation
of positive contents by updates, made formal in the next result.
Proposition 1. Let (S, ap,up,val ) be an appearance-update coalgebra. Then
for all positive contents μ,a l ls t a t e ss ∈ S, and all actions a ∈ Ac such that
up(s)(a)  = ∗, we have
s |= μ =⇒ up(s)(a) |= μ
Proof. The statement is proved by induction on μ.I fμ is a fact or the negation
of a fact, the conclusion follows directly from the preservation of facts. Now
suppose that s |= μ  implies up(s)(a) |= μ  for all states s ∈ S and applicable
actions a ∈ Ac. Also, let s ∈ S and A ∈ Ag be such that s |= Aμ . To show that
up(s)(a) |= Aμ  for any applicable action a, we use the rationality restriction to
reduce ap(up(s)(a))(A)t o{up(t)(a ) | t ∈ ap(s)(A),a   ∈ Aca,A,u p (t)(a )  = ∗}.
Thus, we must show that up(t)(a ) |= μ  whenever t ∈ ap(s)(A)a n da  ∈ Aca,A
are such that up(t)(a )  = ∗. But this follows from the induction hypothesis and
the assumption that s |= Aμ . The cases when μ is the true proposition or a
conjunction of contents are trivial.
The above result does not hold for negative contents. That is, there exists an
appearance-update coalgebra (S, ap,up,val ), a state s ∈ S with an applicable
action a ∈ Ac and a negative content μ such that s |= μ but up(s)(a) |= ¬μ.
For an example of such a situation, which gives rise to the epistemic puzzle
of muddy children, see [8]. It is also not possible to generalise the above result
to an exclusive one for positive contents. In particular, any appearance-update
coalgebra that contains in its set of actions a neutral action τ with μτ = tt and
Acτ,A = {τ} for all A ∈ Ag is such an example. To see why, we refer the reader
to the next section where we prove that such an action preserves all contents.
Another consequence of the restrictions in R is the following acquisition of
knowledge after updates:
Proposition 2. Let (S, ap,up,val ) be an appearance-update coalgebra. Then
for all agents A ∈ Ag,a l ls t a t e ss ∈ S, and all applicable actions a ∈ Ac with
positive contents μa  for all a  ∈ Aca,A, we have
up(s)(a) |= A

a ∈Aca,A
μa 
Proof. Let s ∈ S and a ∈ Ac be such that up(s)(a)  = ∗. We must show that for
A ∈ Ag we have s  |=

a ∈Aca,A μa  for all s  ∈ ap(up(s)(a))(A). By the rational-
ity restriction on ap(up(s)(a))(A), we must show that up(t)(a ) |=

a ∈Aca,A μa 
whenever t ∈ ap(s)(A)a n da  ∈ Aca,A are such that up(t)(a )  = ∗.B yt h e
content restriction, the positivity of μa  and the preservation result we obtain
up(t)(a ) |= μa , which implies up(t)(a ) |=

a ∈Aca,A μa .
The known preservation results in the literature are special cases of our general
results. For instance, it has been shown in [3] that contents that do not contain
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3E p i s t e m i c A c t i o n s
In this section, we present epistemic actions, describe their contents and appear-
ances, and prove their knowledge acquisition eﬀects on agents6.
Skip. This is the action τ in which nothing happens. We have μτ = tt and
Acτ,A = {τ} for all A ∈ Ag. This particular choice of μτ and Acτ,A is suﬃcient
to guarantee that, in any appearance-update coalgebra, the skip action does not
aﬀect the epistemic content of states; that is, no knowledge is lost or acquired
as a result of this action. This is formalised in the next two results, where we
write F : Set → Set for the functor deﬁned by F(S)=Pκ(S)Ag ×P(At).
Proposition 3. In any appearance-update coalgebra (S, ap,up,val ) where the
set Ac of actions includes the τ action, up(s)(τ) ∼F s for any state s ∈ S,w h e r e
∼F ⊆ S×S denotes the F-bisimilarity relation on the F-coalgebra (S, ap,val ).
Proof. The statement follows by coinduction, namely by showing that the re-
lation R ⊆ S × S given by {(s,up(s)(τ)) | s ∈ S } is an F-bisimulation. The
preservation of facts ensures that R only relates states with the same valuations,
whereas the rationality restriction guarantees closure of R under appearances.
Since F-bisimilar states satisfy the same content formulas, a stronger preserva-
tion of knowledge result can now be formulated for the τ action.
Corollary 1. Let (S, ap,up,val ) be an appearance-update coalgebra. Then for
all contents μ and all states s ∈ S, we have
s |= μ ⇐⇒ up(s)(τ) |= μ
Public Announcements. The public announcement of a content μ is denoted μ!,
and has Acμ!,A = {μ!} for all A ∈ Ag. We deﬁne truthful common knowledge of
ac o n t e n tμ among a group β of agents as follows
CKβ μ :=

 A0,A1,...,An ∈β∗
A0A1 ...Anμ
where β∗ = ∪i∈N βi is the set of all ﬁnite sequences of agents in β, including the
empty sequence. Excluding the empty sequence provides us with the notion of
not necessarily truthful common knowledge, denoted ∗
βμ.
We now show that the public announcement of a positive content results in
truthful common knowledge of that content.
6 To be in line with the existing literature, we consider contents rather than pre-
conditions of actions. The diﬀerence between the two is best seen in an exam-
ple: the content of a public announcement is simply the announced proposition μ,
whereas its precondition is the conjunction of μ with the knowledge of the announcer
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Proposition 4. For a state s of an appearance-update coalgebra in which the pub-
lic announcement μ! with positive μ is possible, we have up(s)(μ!) |= CKAg μ.
Proof. We must show that for any state s and any state s  connected to the
applicable update up(s)(μ!)  = ∗ via any sequence of appearance maps we have
s  |= μ. Thus, we have a sequence of states up(s)(μ!) = s0,s 1,...,s m = s  such
that for 0 ≤ j<mand some agent Aj ∈ Ag we have sj+1 ∈ ap(sj)(Aj). For
m =0 ,s0 |= μ follows from the applicability of update up(s)(μ!)  = ∗, the content
restriction, and the preservation result. For m>0, we have that sm is in the
following set of nested appearances
ap(...(ap(ap(up(s)(μ!))(A0))(A1))...)(Am−1)
which, by applying the rationality restriction m times, is equal to
{up(tm)(μ!) | tm ∈ ap(tm−1)(Am−1),...,t 2 ∈ ap(t1)(A1),t 1 ∈ ap(s)(A0),
and up(t1)(μ!)  = ∗,u p (t2)(μ!)  = ∗,...,up(tm)(μ!)  = ∗}
By the content restriction up(tm)(μ!)  = ∗ is equivalent to tm |= μ,a n df r o mt h i s
by the preservation result it follows that up(tm)(μ!) |= μ.
The closest special case to this proposition is that of [3], where the authors show
that common knowledge of a fact implies preservation of any content under the
public announcement of that fact.
Private Announcements. A private announcement μ!β is the action of announc-
ing the content μ to a subgroup of agents β ⊆ Ag with Acμ!β,B = {μ!β} for
B ∈ β and Acμ!β,A = {τ} for A/ ∈ β.
As expected, one can prove that the private announcement of a positive con-
tent to a subgroup of agents results in truthful common knowledge of that con-
tent among the subgroup, and has no visible eﬀect outside the subgroup.
Proposition 5. For β ⊆ Ag and a state s of an appearance-update coalge-
bra in which the private announcement μ!β with positive μ is possible, we have
up(s)(μ!β) |= CKβ μ and ap(up(s)(μ!β))(A) ∼P ap(s)(A) for A/ ∈ β7.
Lying. We write μ†A for the action with content ¬μ in which an agent A lies
that μ to the rest of the agents. We have Acμ†A,A = {μ†A} and Acμ†A,B = {μ!}
for any B  = A.
Proposition 6. For any agent A ∈ Ag, β = Ag \{ A}, and any state s of an
appearance-update coalgebra in which the lying action μ†A with a positive μ is
possible, we have up(s)(μ†A) |= ∗
β μ and up(s)(μ†A) |= A∗
β μ.
Proof. In order to show that up(s)(μ†A) |= ∗
β μ, we must show that for any
state s and any state s  connected to the applicable update up(s)(μ†A)  = ∗
7 Here ∼
P denotes the lifting of the bisimilarity relation on S to P(S), see e.g. [12].Coalgebraic Epistemic Update Without Change of Model 165
via any sequence of length more than 1 of appearance maps of agents in β,w e
have s  |= μ. Consider a sequence of states up(s)(μ†A)=s0,s 1,...,s m = s 
with 1 ≤ m, such that for 0 ≤ j<mand some agent Bj ∈ Ag \{ A} we have
sj+1 ∈ ap(sj)(Bj). It follows that sm is in the following set of nested appearances
ap(...(ap(ap(up(s)(μ†A))(B0))(B1))...)(Bm−1)
which, by applying the rationality restriction m times (once for the lying action
μ†A and B0 and m−1 times for the public announcement μ!a n dB1 to Bm−1),
is equal to
{up(tm)(μ!) | tm ∈ ap(tm−1)(Bm−1),...,t 2 ∈ ap(t1)(B1),t 1 ∈ ap(s)(B0),
and up(t1)(μ!)  = ∗,u p (t2)(μ!)  = ∗,...,up(tm)(μ!)  = ∗}
By the content restriction up(tm)(μ!)  = ∗ is equivalent to tm |= μ,a n df r o mt h i s
by the preservation result it follows that up(tm)(μ!) |= μ.
Now to show that up(s)(μ†A) |= A∗
β μ, we must show that t |= ∗
β μ for all
t ∈ ap(up(s)(μ†A))(A). By the rationality restriction we have
ap(up(s)(μ†A))(A)={up(w)(μ†A) | w ∈ ap(s)(A),u p (w)(μ†A)  = ∗}
Since up(w)(μ†A)  = ∗ and μ is positive, it follows from up(s)(μ†A) |= ∗
β μ that
up(w)(μ†A) |= ∗
β μ.
Security Actions. A security action μ μ  
{A},β,γ is a private announcement in
an unsafe communication channel, where the intruders in γ change the origi-
nal content μ,s e n tb yA to the agents in β,t oaf a k eo n eμ .I nt h i sc a s ew e
have Acμ μ 
{A},β,γ,A = {μ!β∪{A}}, Acμ μ 
{A},β,γ,B = {μ !β∪{A}} for agents B ∈ β,
Acμ μ 
{A},β,γ,C = {μ μ  
{A},β,γ} for the intruders C ∈ γ, while Acμ μ 
{A},β,γ,D =
{τ} for any other agent D ∈ Ag \ ({A}∪β ∪ γ).
Proposition 7. For any agents B ∈ β, C ∈ γ, and any state s of an appearance-
update coalgebra in which the security action μ μ 
{A},β,γ with positive μ and μ  is
possible, we have up(s)(μ μ 
{A},β,γ) |= ACKβ μ, up(s)(μ μ 
{A},β,γ) |= ∗
βA μ 
and up(s)(μ μ  
{A},β,γ) |= CKγ(ACKβ μ ∧ ∗
βA μ ).
4 Comparison with Baltag’s Coalgebraic Model
We now compare our coalgebraic semantics with that of [1]. In loc. cit., both
epistemic states and epistemic actions are deﬁned via ﬁnal coalgebras. Two dif-
ferent functors of a similar shape are used to achieve this. However, none of
these functors accounts for epistemic updates, which are instead modelled using
a partial product between coalgebras of states and coalgebras of actions.
The functor used in [1] to model epistemic states is
F : Set → Set, F(S)=Pκ(S)
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Appearances of states to agents are encoded as elements of Pκ(S)Ag, while their
valuations are encoded using sets of atomic propositions. Epistemic states are
then deﬁned as elements of the ﬁnal F-coalgebra Ψ. Similarly, epistemic actions
are deﬁned as elements of the ﬁnal coalgebra of the functor
G : Set → Set, G(Σ)=Pκ(Σ)Ag ×P(Ψ)
with Pκ(Σ)Ag encoding the appearances of actions to agents, and P(Ψ)e n c o d -
ing the contents of actions (as sets of epistemic states where the actions are
applicable). Finally, epistemic updates are modelled using a functor
−⊗−: Coalg(F) × Coalg(G) → Coalg(F)
which takes a pair consisting of anF-coalgebra(S, apS,val S )a n daG-coalgebra
(Σ, apΣ,cont Σ )t oa n o t h e rF-coalgebra whose elements correspond to updates
of states in S with actions in Σ.W r i t i n g! S : S → Ψ for the unique F-coalgebra
morphism arising from the ﬁnality of Ψ, the coalgebra for the updated states has
carrier
S ⊗ Σ = {(s,σ) ∈ S × Σ | !S(s) ∈ contΣ(σ)}
That is, updated states are pairs consisting of a state s ∈ S and an action σ ∈ Σ,
with the additional property that the content of the action σ makes it applicable
to the state s8. The coalgebra map  apS⊗Σ,val S⊗Σ  : S ⊗ Σ → F(S ⊗ Σ)i s
given by
apS⊗Σ(s,σ)(A)={(s ,σ ) ∈ S ⊗ Σ | s  ∈ apS(s)(A),σ   ∈ apΣ(σ)(A)}
valS⊗Σ(s,σ)=valS(s)
That is, the appearances of updated states to agents are computed using both the
appearances of the original states and the appearances of the actions producing
the updates.
In contrast to the above, our approach uses only one functor, which incorpo-
rates both the epistemic and the dynamic aspect of states. This internal mod-
elling of updates is made possible by the fact that we apriorily ﬁx a universe
Ac of actions, together with its epistemic structure. The set Ac should be taken
to contain those epistemic actions (elements of the ﬁnal G-coalgebra) which are
of interest to the modelling of a particular multi-agent scenario. In this setting,
our choice to specify for each action a ∈ Ac and agent A ∈ Ag,as e tAca,A of
actions that are perceived by A, together with for each action a ac o n t e n tμa,
gives rise to a coalgebra (Ac, apAc,μ Ac ) of the following functor
H : Set → Set, H(Σ)=Pκ(Σ)Ag × C
where the set C consists of equivalence classes of content formulas. Here, two
content formulas are said to be (semantically) equivalent if they are satisﬁed by
8 Here it is assumed that the applicability of an action is invariant under bisimulation,
and therefore an action is applicable to a state precisely when it is applicable to its
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the same states of any F-coalgebra. The map apAc of the previously mentioned
H-coalgebra is given by apAc(a)(A)=Aca,A for a ∈ Ac and A ∈ Ag,w h e r e a s
the map μAc takes actions a ∈ Ac to the equivalence class of their content [μa].
In this way, we do not distinguish between actions that have both the same
epistemic structure and semantically equivalent contents.
In order to make precise the relationship between appearance-update T-
coalgebras and the models of [1], we make the dependency of T on the set
Ac of actions explicit, and write TAc : Set → Set for the functor given by
TAcX =( PκX)Ag × (1 + X)Ac ×P(At)
Next, we let AppUpCoalg denote the category whose objects are pairs (Ac,S),
with Ac =( Ac, apAc,μ Ac )a nH-coalgebra and S =( S, apS,up S,val S )a n
appearance-update TAc-coalgebra. The H-coalgebra Ac encodes the structure on
the set Ac of actions required to formulate the content and rationality restrictions
of Section 2, whereas the TAc-coalgebraS speciﬁes a set of states carrying both an
epistemic structure and a dynamic structure w.r.t. the actions in Ac. To deﬁne
the arrows of the category AppUpCoalg,w eﬁ r s tn o t et h a ta n yH-coalgebra
morphism f : Ac → Ac  induces a functor
Uf : Coalg(TAc ) → Coalg(TAc)
which takes a TAc -coalgebra (S, apS,up S,val S )t ot h eTAc-coalgebra with
the same carrier set and appearance and valuation maps, but with an update
map w.r.t. the set Ac instead. This update is derived from the curried version
ev(upS): S × Ac  → (1 + S) of the update map upS of the TAc -coalgebra, as
shown below
S × Ac
idS×f  S × Ac 
ev(upS)  1+S
The curried version of this composition is the update map of the TAc-coalgebra
ev(ev(upS) ◦ (idS × f)): S → (1 + S)Ac
So we have Uf(S, apS,up S,val S )=( S, apS,ev(ev(upS) ◦ (idS × f)),val S ).
Now the arrows from (Ac,S)t o( Ac ,S ) in the category AppUpCoalg are pairs
of maps (f,g)w i t hf : Ac → Ac  an H-coalgebra morphism and g : S → UfS 
a TAc-coalgebra morphism. The former encodes the actions in Ac as actions in
Ac , whereas the latter translates the states of the TAc-coalgebra S to states of
the TAc -coalgebra S .
The last piece of notation we require before relating our models to those of [1]
concerns characteristic formulas for states of F-coalgebras. These are inﬁnitary
formulas of the form used in Section 2 to specify the contents of epistemic actions,
and have the additional property that they characterise individual states of F-
coalgebrasup to bisimulation. Their existence is guaranteedby the κ-accessibility
of F. In particular, for any state ψ of the ﬁnal F-coalgebra Ψ,t h e r ee x i s t sa
characteristic formula φψ with the property that, given any state s of an F-
coalgebra S,w eh a v es |= φψ if and only if !S(s)=ψ.168 C. Cˆ ırstea and M. Sadrzadeh
We are now ready to describe the relationship between the models of [1] and
our appearance-update coalgebras. This is given by an adjunction
Coalg(F) × Coalg(G)
L 
⊥ AppUpCoalg
R

Deﬁnition 2 (Left adjoint). We let L : Coalg(F)×Coalg(G) → AppUpCoalg
be deﬁned by L(S,Σ)=( ( Σ, apΣ,μ Σ ),(S , apS ,up S ,val S  )),w h e r e
– μΣ(σ)=

ψ∈contΣ(σ) φψ,w h e r ef o rψ ∈ Ψ, φψ is the characteristic formula
of ψ.
– S  =( S , apS ,up S ,val S  ) is a TΣ-coalgebra obtained by
1. ﬁrst letting S  =( S , apS ,val S  )=∪i∈ω(Si, apSi,val Si ) where
S0 = S, Si+1 = Si ⊗ Σ for i ∈ ω
(Note that, by deﬁnition, each of the sets Si comes equipped with an
F-coalgebra structure, and S  inherits this structure.)
2. subsequently endowing the set S  with an update map upS  : S  → (1 +
S )Σ, by letting
upS (si)(σ)=

(si,σ) if(si,σ) ∈ Si+1
∗ otherwise
, for i ∈ ω
In informal terms, the functor L constructs an H-coalgebra Σ and a TΣ-
coalgebra S  from a pair consisting of an F-coalgebra S and a G-coalgebra Σ.
The H-structure of Σ is determined by the G-structure of Σ in a trivial way:
appearances of actions to agents are already deﬁned by the H-structure, whereas
the content map μΣ : Σ → C acts on an action σ ∈ Σ by logically joining all
the characteristic formulas of states in the content of σ.T h eTΣ-coalgebra S  is
obtained by performing consecutive update products with the actions in Σ,ﬁ r s t
on S, and then on the result of the preceding update product:
S  −→ S ⊗ Σ  −→ (S ⊗ Σ) ⊗ Σ  −→ ...
and subsequently taking the union of the resulting F-coalgebras and endowing
it with an update map.
Proposition 8. The TΣ-coalgebra S  is an appearance-update coalgebra.
Proof. We have to show that S  satisﬁes all the restrictions in R. The preserva-
tion of facts follows directly from the deﬁnitions of Si and S :f o ri ∈ ω, whenever
upS (si)(σ) ∈ S , that is, whenever (si,σ) ∈ Si+1,w eh a v e
valS (upS (si)(σ)) = valSi+1(si,σ)=valSi(si)=valS (si)
For the rationality restriction, assuming upS (si)(σ) ∈ S ,t h a ti s ,( si,σ) ∈ Si+1,
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apS (upS (si)(σ))(A)=apSi+1(si,σ)(A)
= {(s ,σ ) ∈ Si ⊗ Σ | s  ∈ apSi(si)(A),σ   ∈ apΣ(σ)(A)}
and
{upS (t)(σ
 ) | t ∈ apS (si)(A),σ
  ∈ apΣ(σ)(A),u p S (t)(σ
 )  = ∗} =
{(t,σ ) | t ∈ apSi(si)(A),σ  ∈ apΣ(σ)(A),(t,σ ) ∈ Si+1} =
{(t,σ
 ) ∈ Si ⊗ Σ | t ∈ apSi(si)(A),σ
  ∈ apΣ(σ)(A)}
for each i ∈ ω, and therefore
apS (upS (s )(σ))(A)=
{upS (t)(σ
 ) | t ∈ apS (s
 )(A),σ
  ∈ apΣ(σ)(A),u p S (t)(σ
 )  = ∗}
Finally, for the content restriction, we have, for each i ∈ ω
upS (si)(σ) ∈ S  iﬀ (si,σ) ∈ Si+1 = Si ⊗ Σ iﬀ
!Si(si) ∈ contΣ(σ)i ﬀ! Si(si) |= μΣ(σ)i ﬀ
!S (si) |= μΣ(σ)i ﬀsi |= μΣ(σ)
and hence upS (si)(σ) ∈ S  iﬀ si |= μΣ(σ).
Deﬁnition 3 (Right adjoint). We deﬁne R : AppUpCoalg → Coalg(F) ×
Coalg(G) by R(Ac,S)=( ( S, apS,val S ),(Ac, apAc,cont Ac ), where the map
contAc : Ac →P (Ψ) takes an action a ∈ Ac to the set of states in the ﬁnal
F-coalgebra which satisfy the formula μAc(a).
Informally speaking, the functor R takes a pair consisting of an H-coalgebra Ac
and an appearance-update TAc-coalgebra S, and produces an F-coalgebra and a
G-coalgebra. The F-coalgebra is obtained from S by forgetting its update map
and keeping everything else intact. The G-coalgebra has the same carrier set and
epistemic structure as Ac, and a content map obtained essentially by replacing
content formulas with their denotations in the ﬁnal F-coalgebra.
Theorem 1. L is left adjoint to R.
Proof. We begin by examining the unit and counit of this adjunction. Since the
categories Coalg(H)a n dCoalg(G) are naturally isomorphic, it is the move from
TAc-coalgebras to F-coalgebras and back that makes the adjunction non-trivial.
For the unit of the adjunction, the inclusions ηS,Σ : S → S ∪ (S ⊗Σ)∪ ((S ⊗
Σ) ⊗ Σ) ∪ ... together with the natural isomorphism between Coalg(H)a n d
Coalg(G) give rise to a natural transformation η : IdCoalg(F)×Coalg(G) ⇒ R ◦L.
For the counit, the maps  Ac,S : S ∪ (S ⊗ Ac) ∪ ((S ⊗ Ac) ⊗ Ac) ∪ ...→ S
deﬁned inductively by
 Ac,S(s)=s,  Ac,S(si,a)=upS( Ac,S(s))(a)f o r i ∈ ω and si ∈ Si
together with the natural isomorphism between Coalg(H)a n dCoalg(G), yield
a natural transformation   : L ◦ R ⇒ IdAppUpCoalg.170 C. Cˆ ırstea and M. Sadrzadeh
We show that η and   indeed constitute the unit and counit of an adjunction
L   R. To this end, we ﬁx (S,Σ) ∈ Coalg(F) × Coalg(G)a n d( Ac,S ) ∈
AppUpCoalg.F o r( f,g):( S,Σ) → R(Ac,S ), the map f# : S ∪(S ⊗Σ)∪((S ⊗
Σ) ⊗ Σ) ∪ ...→ S  deﬁned inductively by
f#(s)=f(s),f #(si,σ)=upS (f#(si))(g(σ)) for i ∈ ω
is a TAc-coalgebra morphism that satisﬁes R(g,f#) ◦ η(S,Σ) =( f,g). Further-
more, any TAc-coalgebra morphism with the above property is deﬁned in this
way. For (h,k):L(S,Σ) → (Ac,S ), the map k  : S → S  given by kS deﬁnes
an F-coalgebra morphism that satisﬁes  (Ac,S ) ◦L(k ,h)=( h,k). Furthermore,
this last requirement uniquely determines the deﬁnition of k .
5 Coalgebraic Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Coalgebras give rise to modal logics in diﬀerent ways, for example the coalge-
braic logic of Moss [13], the temporal logic of Jacobs [11], and the modular logic
of Cˆ ırstea and Pattinson [5,6]. In previous work [15], we showed how one ob-
tains an algebraic logic from our functor by predicate lifting, and investigated
the connection between this logic and the algebraic dynamic epistemic logic
of [2,14]. Cˆ ırstea and Pattinson have shown how complete and expressive coalge-
braic logics can be derived in a modular fashion for an inductively-deﬁned class
of endofunctors on Set. By applying this method to our setting, we obtain a
logic with a multi-sorted syntax, which is expressive – that is, two states are
bisimilar if and only if they satisfy the same formulas –, and admits a sound
and complete proof system. Because of the particular shape of the functor T
and of the axioms in the associated proof system, the multi-sorted syntax of
this logic can be simpliﬁed to the following single-sorted syntax, with no loss in
expressiveness
φ ::= tt | p |¬ φ | φ ∧ φ | Aφ | [a]φ
The standard knowledge and dynamic modalities, that is, A (to be read as ’A
knows φ’) and [a] (to be read as ’after a, φ’), are recovered by letting Aφ ::=
[π1][A]φ and [a]φ ::= [π2][a][κ2]φ 9. In particular, the statement ’action a does
not go through’ is captured by the formula [a]ﬀ. Using the simpliﬁed syntax, the
original proof system is equivalent to the following set of axioms and rules
  tt    φ ∧  ψ → (φ ∧ ψ)
  φ → ψ
   φ →  ψ
for  ∈{ A,[a]},a n d
  [a](φ ∨ ψ) → [a]φ ∨ [a]ψ
on top of propositional logic10. As a consequence of the results in [6], this proof
system is sound and complete w.r.t. T-coalgebras.However, in order to formulate
9 See [6] for details of the multi-sorted syntax.
10 As in [6], we include all instances of propositional tautologies and the modus ponens
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a soundness and completeness result w.r.t. appearance-update coalgebras, the
restrictions deﬁning appearance-update coalgebras must also be axiomatised. To
this end, we add the following axioms to the previous proof system:
  [a]p ↔ (¬[a]ﬀ → p)   [a]A φ ↔ (¬[a]ﬀ →

a ∈Aca,A
A [a ]φ)
φa ↔¬ [a]ﬀ
where for an action a ∈ Ac, its content is denoted by φa. There is one such axiom
for each epistemic action a and each (type of) agent A.
Example of Derivation. Consider a simple Man in the Middle Attack: agent A
sends a message with factual content p to agent B, but on the way the intruder C
changes p to another fact p  and thus B receives p  instead. If we assume that A
does not suspect the interception, after sending p he believes that B believes in
p. Similarly, upon receipt, B believes that A believes in p . In security terms and
since A and B do not suspect the interception, they will wrongly authenticate
with each other. We use the encoding of the security action in Section 2 to prove
that   [p p  
A,B,C]ABp. The proof steps are sketched below:
  tt
(propositional logic)  ¬ [p p
 
A,B,C]ﬀ → tt
(modular logic)  ¬ [p p
 
A,B,C]ﬀ → Att
(propositional logic)  ¬ [p p
 
A,B,C]ﬀ → A(¬[p!B]ﬀ → tt)
(modular logic)  ¬ [p p
 
A,B,C]ﬀ → A(¬[p!B]ﬀ → Btt)
(propositional logic)  ¬ [p p
 
A,B,C]ﬀ → A(¬[p!B]ﬀ → B(p → p))
(content axiom)  ¬ [p p
 
A,B,C]ﬀ → A(¬[p!B]ﬀ → B(¬[p!B]ﬀ → p))
(preservation of facts axiom)  ¬ [p p
 
A,B,C]ﬀ → A(¬[p!B]ﬀ → B[p!B]p)
(rationality for B wrt p!B)  ¬ [p p
 
A,B,C]ﬀ → A[p!B]Bp
(rationality for A wrt p p
 
A,B,C)   [p p
 
A,B,C]ABp
With the additional axioms, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 2 (Soundness and Completeness). A formula holds in all
appearance-update coalgebras if and only if it is derivable in the appearance-
update logic.
Proof. The proof of both soundness and completeness is detailed in [8]. Here
we only sketch the completeness proof. This follows the same line as the com-
pleteness result for dynamic epistemic logic [3], and is based on a translation
between our appearance-update logic (with appearance-update coalgebras as
models) and ordinary epistemic logic (with F-coalgebras as models). As in [3],
this translation has the property that a formula φ is semantically equivalent to
its translation φt. Moreover, the axioms and rules of appearance-update logic
ensure that   φ ↔ φt. These properties, together with our result in [8] that the172 C. Cˆ ırstea and M. Sadrzadeh
ﬁnal F-coalgebra can be extended to an appearance-update coalgebra, allow us
to make use of the completeness result of [6] for F-coalgebras in order to prove
completeness of appearance-update logic w.r.t. appearance-update coalgebras.
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